A central tenet of contemporary moral psychology is that people typically reject active forms of utilitarian sacrifice. Yet, evidence for secularization and declining empathic concern in recent decades suggests the possibility of systematic change in this attitude. In the present study, we employ hypothetical dilemmas to investigate whether judgments of utilitarian sacrifice are becoming more permissive over time. In a cross-sectional design, age negatively predicted utilitarian moral judgment (Study 1). To examine whether this pattern reflected processes of maturation, we asked a panel to re-evaluate several moral dilemmas after an eight-year interval but observed no overall change (Study 2). In contrast, a more recent age-matched sample revealed greater endorsement of utilitarian sacrifice in a time-lag design (Study 3). Taken together, these results suggest that today's younger cohorts increasingly endorse a utilitarian resolution of sacrificial moral dilemmas.
Introduction
In 1967, the philosopher Philippa Foot published an essay on an obscure ethical principle, the doctrine of double effect. Her essay introduced now-famous cases like the trolley problem in order to crystalize the competing mandates of deontology (never to use someone as a means to an end) versus utilitarianism (to promote the good of the many). Next, it argued that moral judgments regarding abortion and euthanasia reflect this precise tension.
In the decades since, public attitudes toward euthanasia and especially abortion have become substantially more permissive (Inglehart, 1997; Norris & Inglehart, 2011) . Might these developments reflect a deeper, more systematic shift in the relative balance of deontological versus utilitarian concerns? To answer this question, we assess evidence for historical change in the way that people resolve the kinds of moral dilemmas posed by Foot fifty years ago.
Two lines of evidence motivate the prediction that utilitarian moral values are on the rise. The first concerns cohort changes in trait empathy and their predicted consequences for moral psychology. In largescale cross-sectional studies (total N > 70,000) of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983)-a multidimensional measure of selfreported affect-younger participants report lower scores on the empathic concern subscale than either middle-aged or older adults (O'Brien, Konrath, Grühn, & Hagen, 2013) . Meanwhile, a cross-temporal meta-analysis of 72 administrations of the IRI among United States college students revealed a general decline in self-reported empathy between 1979 and 2009 (Konrath, O'Brien, & Hsing, 2011 . This generational trend predicts a weakening prohibition on utilitarian sacrifice, since dispositional empathy-as reported on the IRI (Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013; Patil & Silani, 2014) -is linked to deontological reactions to the trolley problem.
Second, numerous Western cultures have undergone processes of secularization (Norris & Inglehart, 2011) , characterized by religious disaffiliation and declines in church attendance (Schwadel, 2010) . In turn, studies in moral psychology reveal that religious believers are more likely to oppose utilitarian sacrifice (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Piazza & Landy, 2013 )-a pattern which may arise from their more intuitive cognitive style (Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012 ) and a corresponding preference for the intrinsic moral evaluation of acts (Hannikainen, Miller, & Cushman, 2017) . Together these results provide additional grounds to suspect that utilitarian ethics may be proliferating, at least in secularizing societies.
Motivated by these existing lines of evidence, we examine the hypothesis that utilitarian moral values are spreading over time. Our methods are based on three complementary designs: In Study 1, we evaluate the relationship between age and moral judgment in a crosssectional design, i.e., comparing the moral judgment of different age groups at a fixed point in time. Next, in Study 2, we examine changes in moral judgment over the human life span in a fixed panel adopting a longitudinal design. Finally, in Study 3, we employ a time-lag approach, comparing the moral judgment of similar age groups at different periods. 
